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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE S'l'A'l'E OF U'l'All 
D. CLARK WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MERRILL L. OLDROYD, GERALD CARTER, 
and JOHN A. CANTO, 
Case No. 15313 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for trespass and to quiet title 
to certain real property located in Utah County, Utah. The 
defendants denied any trespass or damage, and counterclaimed 
to quiet title to said property in defendant Gerald Carter, 
and to reform various deeds, on the basis of erroneous deed 
descriptions and prolonged acquiescence in established natural 
and man-made boundary lines. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, 
District Judge. By stipulation in open court, the action was 
dismissed against defendant Merrill L. Oldroyd. On February 14, 
1977, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were made, and 
judgment was entered against defendants. Defendants then 
filed· .. J' 
or. .. 
a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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in the Alternative, for a New Trial. This motion was denied~ 
June 13, 1977. Defendants Gerald Carter and John A. Canton~ 
appeal from the entry of judgment and denial of the motion. 
RELIEF SOUGH'l' ON APPEAL 
Appellants respectfully ask the Court: 
1. To reverse the judgment of the trial court and to enter a 
2. 
3. 
judgment quieting title to the disputed property in appellar.
1 
Gerald Carter. 
To find that a boundary by acquiescence has been establishec: 
consisting of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad right-of-w,: 
on the north, an existing fence line adjacent to Tie-Fork I 
Creek on the east, U.S. Highway 6 on the south, and the west! 
boundary of a pond on the west. I 
To reform and correct the basic deed and subsequent convey· 
! 
ances in the chain of title to conform with the true in ten·· 
tion of the parties at the times of their execution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I 
The evidence developed in the case shows that on or at) 
May 22, 1954, the plaintiff, in concert with Clifton Huff and 
Dennis L. Prince, formed a partnership under the name and style 
of Skyline Enterprises, and on the same date the plaintiff and 1 
his then wife, Evelyn J. Williams, conveyed by warranty deed tc 
D. Clark Williams, Clifton Huff, and Dennis L. Prince, a 
partnership doing business as Skyline Enterprises, a metes and 
bounds description of a tract of land purporting to comprise 
10. 74 acres in Section 14, Township 10 South, Range 6 East, 
-2-
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Salt Lake Base and Meridian. (Exhibits "27" and "12tt) The 
partnership constructed and operated a motel, service station, 
and restaurant facility on the property described in said deed, 
with camping facilities and areas for deer hunters, sportsmen, 
and travelers extending in and upon the land which is disputed 
in this action. ('l'r., pp. 109, 293) 
The deeded description set out in the conveyance of 
May 22, 1954, is itself erroneous, and, if literally followed, 
would embrace a large portion of U.S. Highway 6 on the south, 
and thereby change the northern border consistent therewith. 
(Tr., pp. 7, 10, 13, 21, 66, 69, 85) 
A map of the land in question prepared from a survey 
by Surveying Associates, Inc., was introduced by defendants and 
received in evidence as Exhibit "21", which purports to show, 
within the yellow lines, the possession survey of land claimed 
by the defendants and, by the blue lines, the deeded tract a$ 
adjusted to eliminate the conflict with U.S. Highway 6. That 
portion of the land bounded in yellow lines and located gen-
erally north and east of the blue lines on the plat constitutes 
the disputed area. The northern part of the yellow line follows 
an existing fence line and the south side of the Denver and 
Rio Grande Railroad right-of-way, and the eastern ehd of the 
yellow line follows a fence along Tie-Fotk Creek. The west 
end of the northern and western yellow line also follows, genera11y, 
the west boundary of a pond. The southern boundary 1ine marked in 
yellow follows the north edge of U.S. Highway 6. 
The evidence further shows that subsequent to the 
-3-
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formation of the above-mentioned partnership, two of the 
parties thereto, including the plaintiff, and Wallace Gardner, 
as a successor in interest of Dennis L. Prince, formed a 
corporation under the name and style oi Skyview Enterprises, 
Inc., and transferred the property to that corporation by the 
same erroneous description by which it was originally conveyed 
to the partnership by the plaintiff. (Exhibit "8") 
Sometime prior to January, 1961, the plaintiff 
endeavored to interest the defendant, Merrill L. Oldroyd, in 
the corporation and urged him to purchase the stock of 
Wallace Gardner. (Tr., pp. 117, 233, 234, 239) In conver-
sations between the plaintiff and the defendant, Merrill L. 
Oldroyd, on that occasion, the plaintiff represented to the 
I 
defendant, Oldroyd, that the corporation was the owner of a trac~ 
I 
real property bounded on the north by the right-of-way line 
of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad; on the east by a fence 
adjoining Tie-Fork Creek; on the south by U.S. Highway.Ii; 
and on the west by a pond, which is the precise description 
shown on Exhibit "21" bounded in the yellow lines. (Tr., pp. 
238-239) In reliance on these representations as to the 
property owned by the corporation, the defendant, Oldroyd, 
purchased shares in the corporation and the corporation there-
after occupied, claimed, and utilized all of the land embraced 
within said boundaries as depicted on Exhibit "21" within the 
yellow lines, without any objection, dispute, or question on 
the part of the plaintiff. (Tr., p. 239) 
Sometime prior to July 16, 1963, the defendant, 
-4-
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Olrtroyd, and his family, became the owners of all of the stock 
of Skyview Enterprises, Inc., including the stock of the 
plaintiff. (Tr., pp. 119-120, 239) 
On or about July 16, 1963, Skyview Enterprises, Inc., 
as a corporation, entered into a contract for the sale by that 
corporation and the purchase by D. Lloyd Horlacher, and 
Elda Horlacher, of the premises and property theretofore owned 
and claimed by the corporation. (Exhibit "42") In January of 
1966, D. Lloyd Horlacher assigned his interest under said 
contract to Elda Horlacher. 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Horlacher testified that prior to 
their purchasing the property from Skyview Enterprises, Inc., they 
also had conversations on the land with the plaintiff, Williams, 
who was then operating the property for the corporation, 
at which time they requested that the plaintiff point out the 
physical boundaries of the land owned by the corporation, 
whereupon Williams again represented to them, on two separate 
occasions, that the property was bounded on the north by the 
right-of-way line of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad; on the 
east by a fence adjoining Tie-Fork Creek; on the south by U.S. 
Highway G; and on the west by a pond, the substantial portion 
of which description is enclosed by a long-existing fence and 
is depicted on Exhibit "21" as that land bordered in yeliow 
lines. ('I'r., pp. 207, 215, 261) 
In his pleadings, plaintiff admitted making the 
aforesaid representations both to the Uorlachers and to Oldroyd. 
In his reply to the counterclaim of the defendants, Uhder his 
Th1rd Defense, plaintiff admits that "any statement or commu-
-5-
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nication made by him relative to any land cliiimed by the defenrj. 
ants within Section 14, 'l'ownship 10 South, Range 6 East, Salt 
(Emphasis added.) In 
his Fourth Defense, plr;i n tiff further udrn) ts that "any ::; tcttern€::i 
conununication made by him rclativ~' LO ar.~1 1,11,d claimed by the 
defendants within Section 14, Township 10 South, Range 6 Ectst, 
Salt Lake Mr1idian, was made in good faith and was made wi~ 
probable cause for believing the truth of any statement or 
conununication made." (Emphasis added.) 
The Horlachers, while in possession of the proper~, 
further improved the disputed land by erecU.i;g toilets next 
to 'l'ie-Fork Creek on the east, by installing electrical 
outlet~ on the Horth, <.ill<l by cJ.<•<Jr;inq, '"JT<Hl) 11•1, anc1 sccrli.r,•J 
the disputed area. ('l'r., pp. 217-218, 219, 297-298) 
Mrs. Horlacher and her son, Gerald Carter, lived a~ 
worked OH the property while it was opera tee"! both as a partner:iJ 
and corporation by the plaintiff, from about the years 19'J4 
to 1956, she as a cook, and he as a part-time service statioo 
operator. Both were familic.tr with that property which was occud 
used and claimed by both the partnership and the corporatioo, 
which included that lancl embraced within the yellow lines and 
within the fence lines and railroad and highway rights-of-way 
and the pond, as depicted 011 Exhibit "21". (Tr., PP· 292-293, 
294) 
On or about ,J<ll>Uary 11, ]9fi6, Mrs. llor]acher ei:terec• 
July 16, 1963, with Skyview Enterprises, Inc., to her soi· 
-6-
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Gerdld Carter dnd his wife, dS dssignees and buyers. (Exhibit 
"36") The defendant, Oldroyd, consented to that dgreement 
dnd assignment on or about Jdnudry 21, 1966, as the assignee 
from Skyview Enterprises, Inc., of the seller's interest 
under said contract. The defenddnt, Gerald Carter, and his 
wife then went into possession and have continued to occupy 
dnd claim the property since mi or about January 11, 1966. 
(Tr., pp. 221, 296-297) 
The defendant, John A. Canto, testified that in 
July of 1974, he had a conversation with the plaintiff on the 
property. The plaintiff wanted to employ Canto to do some work 
on the plaintiff's property. Canto said that he could not do 
it until he had finished a job for Carter. When the plaintiff 
inquired as to how long this would take, Canto described the 
work as leveling Carter's land to Tie-Fork Creek on the east 
and the railroad right-of-way on the north. The plaintiff 
made no mention to Canto of any claim of ownership to that 
land, nor did he object in any way to his doing the work. In 
fact, later, while the work was in progress, the plaintiff 
came by on several occasions while Canto was on the land with 
his equipment leveling the disputed area, and the plaintiff 
waved to him, but at no time made any objection to his working 
on the land. ('rr., pp. 271-274) 
Mr. Carter testified that he has consistently occupied, 
claim0d, operated, d11d used the premises and property bounded 
on th0 north by the rdilroad right-of-way, on the east by a 
f-t•nu• c1djacent to Tie-Fork Creek, on the south by U.S. Highway 
-7-
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6, and on the west by a pond, which is the same property 
depicted within tho yellow li110s 011 l·:xhibit "21". Ile further 
testified that at no time did he occupy or operate the µropen,. 
under a lease or any other tenancy arrangement with the 
defendant, Oldroyd, but only as a contract purchaser. 
298-299, 305-306) 
(Tr., pp. 
Mr. Carter confirmed the fact that while he was on 
the property with his mother, Mrs. Horlacher, from about 
1954 to about 1956, he observed the use being made of the 
property by the partnership and corporation, which included 
the land within the disputed area. (Tr., pp. 293, 294) He 
testified that from the time he took over the property, he 
also rented camper spaces throughout the entire disputed area, 
and had as many us thirty-five (3'i) campers n11d trailers in the 
disputed area, at given times, not counting tents or hors~ 
trailers and other vehicles. All of the car·1pers and users of 
this area, including Dennis L. Prince, who wcis one of the orig'· 
partners with the plain ti ff when the land was acquired, imprO'!f. 
and operated in 19 5 4, did so with Carter's permission, and the 
permission of his µrcdecessors in in tercst. ('l'r. , pp. 297-299' 
Mr. Carter further testified that the plair;tiff ncvc 
did contact him nor raise any question with regard to the bour.:I 
of the property until sometime in the yci.tr 1972. (Tr., 
p. 301) At that time, there had been a survr'y made which 
inr1icdt0rl that tll<' ''"!;t bour1rl.1r·y Ji 110 of thr• propPrty i 11 
question might extend east of 'l'ic-Fork Creek by apµroximdtelY 
33 feet. 
-8-
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by Mr. Carter, the plaintiff told Mr. Carter that he (the 
plaintiff) had always understood that the east line of the 
property was Tie-Fork Creek, and advised Mr. Carter to go 
to a place across the street north of the courthouse and 
get some quit-claim deeds, and he would straighten out the 
description. (Tr. , pp. 301-3 0 2) 
In another conversation between the plaintl.ff and 
the defendant, Carter, in about June of 1973, the plaintiff 
asked Carter if he (Carter) would like him (Williams) to come 
over and spray some weeds in the now disputed area. (Tr., 
pp. 303-304) Mr. Carter also testified that he graded, 
harrowed, and plill1ted part of the disputed area with grass, 
and has cut and maintained it since about 1966, and always 
understood the boundaries of the property to be those depicted 
by the yellow lines on Exhibit "21". (Tr., pp. 304-305) 
The first intimation that plaintiff claimed title to 
the disputed land occurred inunediately prior to the conunencement 
by him on September 11, 1974, of his action for alleged 
trespass by the defendants, praying for general and punitive 
damages and for injunctive relief. Subsequently, by amended 
complaint, the plaintiff added to his complaint a prayer 
that the title to the disputed land be quieted in him. 
1'he defendants, by way of <mswer to the amended complaint, 
denied that the plaintiff is the owner of the disputed land, 
etlld furthPr denied that any trespass had been coinmitted 
by lh'-' defendants or damage sustained by the plaintiff as a 
Lr''-'Ul t thereof. 
-9-
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By wo.y of o.ffi1 1tiv•::> defe11ses ctm1 counterclaim 
against the plaintiff, the defenc.lo.nts allegeu that the property' 
in question was originctlly conveyed by the plaintiff and 
his then wife to the predecessors in interest of the defendants,' 
and that the description in said deed ctnd in subsequent 
deeds of the same property was erroneous and did not conform 
to the description of the land intended to be conveyed by 
the parties, and actually occupied and claimed by them. 
'l'he defendants also prayed for injunctive relief against 
the plaintiffs; that the title of the defendant, Carter, 
to the disputed property be quieted in him on the basis 
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; and that the 
origin~l deed from the plaintiff be reformed and corrected 
to accurately describe the land intended to be conveyed 
by the plaintiff anu received by the predecessors in interest 
of the defendants; dlld for general damages, including damage 
for slander of title and punitive damages. 
Immediately after the commencement of the tridl, 
the defendant, Gerald Carter, was stricken by illness dnd 
hospitalized. 'l'he case proceeued without him, and the evidence 
and testimony on behalf of the plaintiff was taken and receivec, 
and all evidence on behalf of the defendants was also tdken 
and received, except for the testimony of the defendant, 
Gerald Carter, which was reserved and the tridl continued 
pending his recovery. 
On Decembc;r 15, 197(,, trial wo.s u'conv011ed for 
the purpose of recej ·ring the testimony of c1efe11c1dnt, 
-10-
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Gerald Ccirter. Following his testimony, upon stipulation 
in open court, the action was dismissed against defendant, 
Oldroyd. Defendants Carter and Canto now appeal from the 
entry of the adverse judgment and ruling in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COUR'l' TO REFUSE TO REFORM 'l'HE DEED IN 
ACCORDANCE WI'l'H 'l'HE IN'l'EN'l'ION OF 'l'HE PAR'l'IES. 
In its memorandum decision of January 27, 1977, 
the trial court decldred that it did not find "sufficient 
facts to order reformdtion of the deed, exhibit 12." The 
court erred in this finding for the following reasons: 
First, the deed description itself is erroneous. 
If literally followed, it includes a substantial porti~n of 
U.S. Highway 6 within its bounddries, and extends beyond to the 
south side of the highway. (Tr . , pp . 7 , l 0 , 13 , 21, 6 6 , 6 9 , 
8 5) 'l'he court was perplexed by this and asked Mr. Neeley, 
a registered land surveyor, the following question: 
Q. (By the court) I can understand, Mr. Neeley, 
the two different surveyors taking the 1560 foot 
by 300 foot rectangle and not coming out in the 
sJmc µlcice. LluL do you huvc any explc;ttdtion as 
to how they both come out in the middle of the 
state highway? Do you have an explanation at 
all? (Tr., p. 85, line 10) 
Mr. Neeley succinctly replied, 
A. Faulty descriptions is all I can say, Judge. 
(Tr., p. 85, line 16) 
Althouc1h the deed description, "along the state 
tcidc1", is presumed to carry title to the center of the 
-11-
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highway, (See Hununcl v. You1,y, 1 Utah 2d 237, 265 P. 2d 410 
(1953); Annot., 2 A.L.R. 6 (1919), supp., Arn;ot., 49 A.L.R. 
2d 982 (1956)), the parties clearly did not intend to convey 
property on the opposite side of the highway, to which they 
held no title. By shifting the deed description northward ~ 
border along the north edge of the highway, the trial court, 
in effect, already has reformed the deed which it said it 
would not reform. Thus, the claim that the deed cannot 
be reformed is nonsense, since it must be reformed from the 
original description, in order to border along the edge of 
the highway. 
Second, the trial court also cited the Restatement 
of Contracts § 504 (1932), which states: 
Except as stated in §§ 506 and 509-511, where both 
parties have an identical intention as to the 
terms to be embodied in a proposed written con-
veyance, assignment, contract or discharge, and 
a writing executed by them is materially at 
variance with that intention, either party 
can get a decree that the writing shall be 
reformed so that it shall express the inten-
tion of the parties, if innocent third 
persons will not be unfairly affected thereby. 
It is clear from the record that both parties 
were mutually mistaken with respect to the faulty deed 
description. After the conveyance from the plaintiff to 
himself and his partners doi1:g business as Skyline 
Enterprises, on or about May 2 2, 19 5 4, the partnership 
operated and occupied a tract of land bounded on the r;orth by 
the right-of-way 1j110 of th(' llenvr 0 r <.rncl Hi o Cr,rnde Railroarl; 
Oil the east by d adjoi1Ji11y Tic-Fork Cu·ek; on the 
by U.S. lliyhway 6; anJ on the west by a pond, which is 
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the land circumscribed by the yellow line on Exhibit "21". 
This fact alone confirms that it was the intention of the 
plaintiff to convey that property within the yellow lines 
on Exhibit "21" when he executed the warranty deed of 
May 22, 1954. 
This intention on the part of the granters 
and grantees in said deed is bolstered by the further 
evidence in the record that when the plaintiff attempted 
to interest the defendant, Oldroyd, in coming into the 
corporation in the latter part of 1960 or the early part of 
1961, he responded to the question of the defendant, Oldroyd, 
as to what property was owned by the corporation, by pointing 
out the physical boundaries thereof on the ground and describ-
ing the tract as bounded on the north by the right-of-way 
line of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad; on the east by a 
fence adjoining Tie-Fork Creek; on the south by U.S. Highway 
6; and on the west by a pond, and it was manifestly the 
understallding of the defendant, Oldroyd, when he bought into 
the corporation, that the corporation owned that property. 
(Tr., pp. 238-239) 
The evidence further shows that the same representa-
tions were made by the plaintiff to Mr. & Mrs. Horlacher, 
the predecessors in interest of the defendant, Carter, prior 
to the time when they purchased the property from Skyview 
Enterprises, Inc., in July of 1963 ('I'r., pp. 207, 215, 261), 
,111d lJott1 Oldroyd and the Ilorlachers relied upon those represen-
t dtjons in purchasing, respectively, their interests in the 
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corporation and the property thereof. 
Most importantly, ill his reply to the counter-
claim of the defendants, under his Third dncl Fourth Defenses, 
the plaintiff admitted that the rcpresentations made by 
him to Oldroyd and the l!orldchers as to the physical bour.darit' 
of the property were true and correct, and were made in 
good faith with probable cause for believi nq them to be 
true. Thus, the rectli ty of these representations, the reliance 
of the parties thereon, and the in ten ti on of the parties 
in contracting with respect to the property cannot be denied. 
A mutuctl mistake in the deeded description is clearly shown. 
It should be noted, further, that in asking for 
reformation of the cleed, the defendants are asking only 
that the deed be reformed to confona to the boundary 
descriptions of the property ii:tended by the µarties, and 
are not asking for !'.'._Ore, but, in fctct, less land than is 
conveyed by the deed. However, even if they were asking for 
more lctnd, this would not be <l sufficient busis for denying 
the application to r0form. 
243 P. 2d 248 (1952). 
See H.oberts v. Hummel, 69 Nev. li; 
This Court, i11 Mawhinn''Y v. Jc11sc11, 120 
Utah 142, 232 P. 2J 769 (1951), has sctid thdt before any 
instrument can be reformed, it is necessary that there be 
pre-existing terms on which the minds of the parties have 
agreed. 
erty be bounded by th<::> na turd l and mG1n -mac.le bou 1~'1 dry l i ne.s' 
previou.sly discussc•cl, sctid u~~yuir<•1:ic1,L is luJl·,- scttisli 1·<i '' 
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this cctse. 
In McMahon v. Tanner, 122 Utah 333, 249 P. 2d 502 
(1952), the Court had before it an application to reform an 
instrument and there held that, although unknown to one of 
the parties, an instrument contains a mistake rendering it 
at varictnce with the prior agreement of the parties, and 
the other party seeks to take advantage of that mistake, 
equity will reform the instrument so as to make it conform 
to the agreement of the parties. 
It should be borne in mind that the plaintiff in 
this case was not only one of the grantors in the original 
deed, dated May 22, 1954, but was also one of the grantees 
therein and in conjunction with the other grantees occupied 
and operated the property up to the physical boundaries cir-
cumscribed by the yellow lines on Exhibit "21", rather 
than to the precise deeded boundaries depicted by the blue 
lines on Exhibit "21". 
'l'his Court has also t<1ke11 the position that a 
written contract will be reformed to express the agreement 
of the parties where proof of the mistake is clear, defi-
nite, <.md convincing, and where he who seeks relief is not 
guilty of inexcusable negligence in executing the instru-
ment and makes timely application for the relief sought. 
Peterson v. Eldredge, 122 Utah 96, 246 P. 2d 886 (1952); 
i~ais~)j 1=_~_\T-~_llodge~, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P. 2d 620 (1957). 
In Naisbitt v. Hodges, supra, this Court held 
Lhctt all that is required for there to be "clear and 
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convincing evidence" sufficicllt to support reformation of 
a deed is that evidence exists whereby this Court can say 
that the trial judge acted as a reasonable man in finding 
that proof of the facts asserted is greater than a mere 
preponderance. 6 Utah 2d at 122, 307 P. 2d at 624. 'l'hat case 
was a proceeding to reform a deed, brought by the grantees' 
successors in interest, as in this case, against the 
grantor. This Court held that the evidence sustained a 
finding that the original parties to the deed intended to 
include an additional 130 foot strip in the conveyance, but 
that in describing the property in the deed they made a 
mutual mistake of fact. 
The case of Janke v. Beckstead, 8 Utah 2d 247, 332 
P. 2d 933 (1958), is quite similar on its facts to the case 
at bar. In that case, the purchasers sought to reform a 
deed to conform to what they alleged was the intention of 
the parties. 'l'he record disclosed that the grantors had 
employed their uncle as their agent to deal with the proper~ 
and had endowed him with authority to act in their behalf; 
that the sellers dllCl the buyers, c1t the time tlw sale was 
ma.de and the documents executed, in tended th ct t the purchaser 
should have a particular trc1ct of land with a frontage of 
140 feet and depth of 200 feet undiminished by any easemer.t 
or right-of-way; and that the parties were mutually mis-
taken in believing thal the documents executed crnd delivered 
did convey such tr;_H.:t of lanu. This Court J1cld thc.l th1' rl<'"'1 
shoulu be reformed under the circurnstctnces. 
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The Court further held that evidence tending to 
vary the description in a deed which otherwise contained 
no latent ambiguities is admissible to vary that descrip-
tion, notwithstanding the parol evidence rule, when 
reformation of the instrument is sought. See also, 
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v. Peart, 30 Utah 2d 201, 515 
P. 2d 614 (1973); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P. 2d 354 (Utah, 1975), 
These doctrines on the question of reformation of 
deeds generally prevail throughout the United States. See, 
~· Geoghegan v. Dever, 30 Wash. 2d 877, 194 P. 2d 397 
(1948); 'I'horsteinson v. Waters, 65 Wash. 2d 739, 399 P. 2d 
510 (1965); Morrissey v. Achziger, 147 Colo. 510, 364 P. 2d 
187 (1961); Aja v. Appleton, 86 Nev. 639, 472 P. 2d 524 (1970). 
In summary, this basic deed in the chain of title 
is subject to reformation on two grounds: First, because of 
the erroneous description, the trial court has already reformed 
it by moving the deed description northward so as to be bounded 
along the north edge of U.S. Highway 6. Second, in view of 
the representations made by plaintiff to both Oldroyd and the 
Horlachers as to the natural and man-made boundaries of the 
property, and the subsequent reliance by defendants and their 
predecessors in interest on such representations, in using 
and occupying the entire property up to said boundaries, the 
deed should be reformed to conform to the intention of the 
[Jurtics thus manifcstcd, and it was error for the trial court 
to refuse to do so. 
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POillT II 
THE 'l'RIAL COUR'l' ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A BOUNDARY LIHE 
ESTABLISHED BY ACQUIESCENCE ALONG 'l'HE NATURAL AND MAN-MADE 
BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTY. 
In its memorandum decision in this case, the 
trial court also declared that it did not find "sufficient 
believable facts to establish a boundary by acquiescense 
[sic.] other than that establishing a rectangular area 
300 feet by 1560 feet adjacent to the highway." As pre-
viously discussed, the erroneous deed description, if 
literally const_rued, places the boundary lines of the prop-
erty so as to include a major portion of U.S. Highway 6, 
as well as property on the opposite side of the highway. 
In order to find the existence of a boundary line adjacent 
to the highway, the trial court had to reform this deed 
description, and somehow find acquiescence in such a 
boundary line. This finding is totally unsupported by the 
evidence, and it was error for the trial court so to rule. 
The rule for establishing boundary by acquiescen~ 
requires that contiguous lctndowners occupy their property 
up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or 
buildings and mutually acquiesce in that line as a boundary 
for a long period of time. Under these circumstances, the 
Court is required to presume existence of a binding boundary 
agreeme1>t, unless the party who attacks the same proves by 
competent evidence that there actually was 1;0 aqreement or 
that there could not have beer.. A formal or conventionnl 
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agreement is not required. See, Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 
16, 232 P. 2d 202 (19Sl); EkberQ v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 
P. 2d 205 (1951); Motzkus v. Carroll, 7 Utah 2d 237, 322 P. 
2d 391 (1958); Harding v. Allen, 10 Utah 2d 370, 353 P. 2d 
911 (1960); Johnson Real Estate Co. v. Nielson, 10 Utah 
2d 380, 353 P. 2d 918 (1960); Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d 
105, 369 P. 2d 117 (1962); King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 
378 P. 2d 893 (1963); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 358, 
431 P. 2d 788 (1967); Johnson v. Sessions, 25 Utah 2d 133, 
477 P. 2c.1 788 (1970); Universal Inv. Coq~. v. Kinssbury, 
26 Utah 2d 35, 484 P. 2d 173 (1971); Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 
2d 119, 505 P. 2d 1199 (1973); Olsen v. Park Dau9:hters 
Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P. 2d 145 (1973); wrisht v. 
Clissold, 521 P. 2d 1224 (Utah, 1974); Hobson v. Panguitch 
Lake Corp., 530 P. 2d 792 (Utah, 1975). See generally; 
Note, Boundary by Acquiescence, 3 Utah L. Rev. 504 (1953). 
Let us examine each element individually with 
respect to the establishment of a boundary by acquiescence. 
First, concerning occupation up to a visible line~ It is 
clear from the evidence that ever since May 22, 1954 '· when 
the plaintiff conveyed the property to himself and others, 
as partners doing business under the name and style of 
Skyline Enterprises, he and his colleagues as grantees, and 
defendants as their successors in interest, have occupied, 
cl0imed, and operated the property up to the phy~ical 
bounr1aries delineated by the yellow line on Exhibit "21". 
1'1,\s embraces a period of more than twenty (20) consecutive 
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years. 'l'he part1;crship and lcitcr, the co1porc.ition, provid~rJ 
ccunping facilities and services .for deer hutiters, sports11Pn, 
and travelers upon the disputcr1 Lmd duriwJ the period when 
it was controlled by Skyline Ei.terprises a1.d :_;kyview E11terpris: 
Inc. ( 'l' r . , pp . l O 9 , 2 9 3 ) /\fter January, 1961, when the defer.: 
ant, Oldroyd, bouql1l i11to the L·ort1oi·ation, <111d subseque1;tly, 
after July 16, l9G3, whc11 the l'ropcrty wus pun.:hdsed by the 
Ilorlachers and ultirnatcly cor;veycd to the defendant, Carter, 
all parties recogni :o::ec1 and acciuicsced in the physical bound-
aries shown by the yellow lines on Exhibit ";:;l". 
'l'he llorlachers and Carter all exercised full 
control over the property up to the natural cti:d man-made 
boundary lines. They allowed deer hunters to come ir~ and caYc 
on the disputed area, the property was grcided without any ob''i 
tion from plair:tiff, and improvements were ciade on the propeni 
itself. Such occupa tio1: ar;d use by de fr'ndan ts has continued 
up to the commencerne1:t of this uctior~. 
Second, with respect to Pm tu al acr1uiescence i.11 the 
boundary lines: 'l'hc drca ci rcurnscribed by the yellow lines 
on Exhibit "21" follows the ~ctturctl contours of the lctnd, 
~,the bOUJld,;ry li11c or 'L'il2-l·'o1k Creek, LIH2 r.d.lroad 
right-of-wcty, the edge of the pond, ctnd the edye of U.S. 
llighwdy 6. As previously discussed, plai11ti Cf on more thJrr i 
one occc1sio11 rcpres<>11 t<'cl to the llor lctchers, uJ clroyJ, and I 
1 i '"'!' 0: tl1<' pro1H_:r Ly were pr<'c:isrl"! 
More in1p0rtan tly, l'L . .ii 11 t.i f1 acJmi L tcd i11 his owr. plC'adi 11 i'.i 
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thdt such reprcsentdtions were true and correct, and were 
made i11 good faith with probable cause. for believing them 
to !Je true. Plaintiff is estopped from denying that such 
representations were made, and is bound by these admissions 
in his pleadings. Therefore, acquiescence in such boundaries 
is clearly shown. 
During the testimony of Mr. Horlacher, the court 
initially sustained objections to the testimony concetning 
plaintiff's oral representations about the boundary lines. 
The ostensible ground for sustaining the objection was that 
there was no evidence that Horlacher had made the purchase 
of the property directly from the plaintiff himself. For some 
reason, the court felt that where it was not shown that plaintiff 
owned the property at the time of the representations, the 
representations themselves were not competent. For example: 
THE COURT:***There is no evidence that he made 
the purchase from Mr. Williams, Mr. Nelson. 
MR. NELSON: But he made it on the basis of 
representation, and that has to do with reference--
THE COURT: Suppose representations were made 
by Santa Claus? 
ME. NELSON: It hcts a bearing, your llonor, on 
showing the various representations that have 
been heretofore made in conflict with what 
Mr. Williams now claims to be the boundaries 
of the property to show that he made inconsistent 
ctnd complete contradictory statements as to where 
the boundaries of the property were, and they 
impectch Mr. Williams's [sic.] testimony. 
'l'l!E COUR'l': Mr. Williams didn't make the sale 
to this man. 
ME. NELSON: But he made representations to him, 
crnd we can show any representations he made to 
crn ybody, if it was John Doe, as to where the 
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property lines were. 
Tl!E COURT: 
6-2 5) 
I hctve ruled. ('l'r., p. 208, lines 
The court subsequently allowed similar testimony~ 
come in, but with tongue in cheek, and was obviously still 
of the same opinion expressed in its prior ruling, and made 
subsequent comments indicatin<J th0t it thouyht little of 
the evidence. For example, upon renewal of the objection, 
the court stated: "I will tell you your objection may be 
well taken, but I am going to let him answer." (Tr., p. 
214, line 23) 
There appears to be no legal authority for the 
proposition that only a landowner can make representations 
with respect to boundary lines of property, nor that such 
representations can be made by a landowner only to his immedi·' 
ate grantee. Plaintiff was a former owner of the property who 
he made such representations and was the owner of the contig· 
uous tract; further, he admitted in his pleadings the tru~~ 
accuracy of the representations made. Although the evidenCT 
was admitted, fi11c1Jly, over objection, the court was clearly 
influenced by its earlier ruling and persisted in its reasoo~ 
expressed therein, and it was error to refuse to fairly consl;;i 
thi~ clearly competer;t evidence in its judgment. 
The gredt preponderance of the evidence, as testific:: 
to by the Horlachers, Dr. Oldroyd, and Mr. CJrter, clearly 
yellow lines on f~xhibit "21", dlH1 subsequent undisturbed 
and undisr11ted occ:up<1tion and control by the llorlachers 
-22- I 
_.a,,., 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dnd Carter of the disputed property. More importantly, 
the plaintiff never objected to the exercise of such control. 
He only waved to defendant Canto while Canto was grading 
the property. He asked permission of Carter to spray weeds 
on the property. After the sale of the property in 1954, 
he removed the old family cabin from the disputed area and 
placed it on his retained property on the east side of Tie-
Fork Creek. ('I'r., pp. 131, 132, 298) 'I'he preponderance of 
credible evidence presented by the defendants in this case 
clearly shows mutual acquiescence in the aforementioned 
boundary lines. The finding by the court of a rectangular 
bounddry adjacent to the property is w1supported by any sub-
stantial evidence, and the court erred in .. so finding. 
Third, with respect to a long period of time: 
Many of the cases have held thdt occupation of respective 
tracts by adjoining landowners for a "long period of time;' 
is equated with the prescriptive period of twenty (20) years. 
However, the cases do not uniformly hold to a twenty (20) 
year miuimum. Each case is decided on this point on the basis 
of the f ~icts. For cxdlnple, in II obs on v. Panguitch Lake 
Corp., supra, the Court held that only under unusual circum-
stances would a period less than twenty (20) years be 
sufficient to create a boundary by acquiescence. In that 
case, because the land was in a remote area and the 
c1rqui.0scence endured for only ten ( 10) years, the Court 
ilPld that this was not sufficient. However, in the case 
of ~k?_crs~ates, supra, the Court held that boundary 
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by acquiescence was established O\'cr a period of eight 
(8) years. 
In the ii:sL .. u;t case, the ctcquiesccnce has 
CJ.ctually endured since 1954, during pctrt of which period 
the plaintiff wore two hats. He was the grdJ>tor in the 
origillal deed and also one of the qrantees, ar.d, during 
that time, both the partnership and the corporation exer-
cised full control over the entire property up to the 
boundctry lines included within the yellow lines on 
Exhibit "21". Since 1963, when the defendant, Oldroyd, 
became the sole owr.er of Skyview Enterprises, Inc., and 
sold the property to the llor l "c/-,r"rs, the plcii ri tiff has 
been cornµletely out of the picture ctnd the property has 
been occupied exclusively by the defendants for f'.lore th<t1• 
thirteen (13) cor:secutive years, ctnd, up to the date of 
initial proceedin<_:s in this acti .. on, contillued to be so occu-
pied ar.d controlled. 
Since the conveyancl' by the plaintiff to the 
partnership known as Skylir.e r·~1;terprises, on or about 
May 22, 1954, the fence along Tie-Fork Creek hcts operated 
as dncl hcts bePn r0cocp1ized by d} l of the parties as the 
boundctry line between them. The rule, announced by the 
Court in the case of Baum v. nefa, 525 P. 2d 725 (Utah, 
1974), is to the effect thctt ct fence, although originally 
crectted dS a barrier i..lnd not as d boundary, cdn become a 
boundctry by acguicsccr1cc afler lh•' pctrccls of ldnd on 
either side hdve beer. co11veycd to separcttc pc.rti.C's; and, 
-24-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
significant to the cn.se now before the Court, the Baum 
case also held that this was true, notwithstanding the 
fact that the fence ran in a zigzag manner, apparently 
not conforming to the deeded description. 
The case of Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 
supra, is also particularly in point. In that case, property 
was conveyed by a metes and bounds description which in 
no way conformed to the meandering line of the Provo River, 
and subsequent tax notices and conveyances all appeared to 
utilize such deeded description, in spite of the fact 
that the parties actually occupied and claimed property 
up to a fence running along the meander line of the river. 
'l'he Court in that case held that boundary by acquiescence 
had been established, notwithstanding the rather obvious 
discrepancy between the deeded description and the physical 
line of the meandering river. 
In the absence of an actual survey, lay grantees 
seldom know or are capable of knowing whether or not a 
particular metes and bounds description conforms to the 
physical boundary lines actually occupied and claimed by 
virtue of fences and other structures and monuments. 
Especially here, where defendants relied upon plaintiff's 
oral representations co1H.:erni11g the boundaries, defendants 
hctd 110 reason to doubt the accuracy of the deeded description. 
Fourth, with respect to adjoining ownership of the 
Lrnd: 'l'wo events are of particular significance on this 
point. First, when defendants' possession survey indicated 
-25-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the boundary of the property might extend some 33 feet 
east of Tie-Fork Creek, plaioti ff, undoubtecll'.y worried thc1t 
he might lose this (ootage, told Mr. Carter thctt he had d~~ 
understood that the east line of the property was 'l'ie-Fork er,, 
and advised Mr. Carter to go to a place across the street 00~ 
of the Utah County Courthouse, and get some quit-claim deeds, 
and he (plaintiff) would straighten out the description. 
(Tr., pp. 301-302) 
Seco11d, at the time of his conveya11ce to the µart-
nership in 1954, µlaintiff owned a small family cabin locate: 
on the disputed property. Subseque11t to his conveyance to 
defendants' predecessors in interest, plaintiff moved thdt 
cabin off the disputed property, across Tie-Fork Creek, on~ 
plaintiff's own property. (Tr., pp. 131, 132, 298) These act 
coupled with plaintiff's orul representations, clearly ir;dicctl' 
plair.tiff's recognitior. of the 11utural anu ma1;-made bour.dary 
lines depicted by thP yellow lin<:s on Exhibit "21". 
'l'he burc1cn of proo t' i11 the pldir: ti:L i's action to 
quiet title rests on hir1, and that burden must be met on 
the strength of his owr. ti tlc, ar;d not because of any weak-
ness in that of the deiei:dan ts. Olsen v. Park Daughters 
Inv. Co., supra. 'l'hat burden was not carried in this case. 
The court's findiny of a bou1;dary ud_iacent to the highway, 
consisting of a rectangular parcel, is wholly unsupported 
by the evidence, il!ld constitutes reversible ei:-ror. 
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POINT III 
THE 1'HlAJ, COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MONEY DAMAGES 'l'O 
PLAINTIFF. 
ln its memorandum decision dated January 27, 
1977, the court found as follows: 
This court is of the view that the measure-
of damages to plaintiff's property by reason 
of removal of the top soil is the difference 
in value before and after the trespass. The 
only evidence, uncontradicted in the record, is 
that the property was worth $6,000.00 per acre 
before the soil disturbance and $3,000.00 per 
acre afterwards. 
Plaintiff is granted judgment for $3,000.00 per 
acre for land distrubed [sic.]. 
'!'he measure of damages in a case of this type 
is the difference in value immediately before and 
immediately after the damage has been committed. ~· 
Cleary v. Shand, 48 Utah 640, 161 P. 453 (1916) ; 
Brereton v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 433 P. 2d 3 (1967); 
Pehrson v. Saderup, 28 Utah 2d 77, 498 P. 2d 648 (1972). 
However, in assessing damages against the 
defendants, the trial court failed to take into account two vital 
points which nullify the award of damages made in this 
Ci.J.Se. 
First, the court states that the only evidence, 
"uncontradicted in the record," was that the property was 
worth $6,000.00 per acre before the alleged trespass, and 
$1,000.00 per acre afterwards. This finding was based 
sol<'ly upon the flat, unsupported assertions of the 
pLii11tiff, as recorded in the transcript: 
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Q. Do you huve cin opi11io1,, Mr. Clctrk [sic.] , i.iS to 
the value of tlw disputed J>roµcrty prior to the 
grading? 
A. Tt would be ctround $6,000.00 ctn dcre. 
Q. Do you hcive aL opinioi; as to its vctlue 
after the grading? 
A. It would cut the value ir: half. (Tr., p. 202) 
This self-serving testimony by plain ti ff was total!; 
u1~supported by any cvide11ce of property Vctlues or surrounrli11i 
circumstances. It was merely a statement of his opinion as 
to how much the proµerty was worth. Such bald assertions 
hctve not been admitted by the courts as competent evidence 
concerning the Vctlue of dctmaged property. 
State Road Comm'n v. Johnsor:, 550 P. 2d 216 (Utah, 1976); 
Burke v. Thomas, 313 P. 2d 1082 (Okla., 1957). 
The cruciul point of plaintiff's testimony, 
however, is not so nmch thctt plaintiff himself testifietl 
as to its value, b11t tl«1t he' did so upon d patently 
erroneous ctssumptio1•. Plctintiff testified thctt he desired 
to build summer homes upon the disputed areu, as well as 
upon his own property, across Tic-Fork Creek. (Tr., PP· 
104-10')) 'l'hc subsL''i11c11t testimoi~y by plctii.tiff's realtor 
witness, Mr. Bctads<Jctctrd, wcts also based upon Vctluation of the 
property <lS a poteLtial site for sumner homPs. 
'l'he property, however, is curre1:tly zoned by 
Utdh Couuty for sct'liccs_ cir;cl !:rc1de,. The cxistinq motel, 
restaurant, <lnd sec1i cc• stciti 011 u1,011 the propr,rty all 
comply with such :?011i "'l res tricti 01;. :~ur.Ln:c1 lLomes 
ctre not permittcJ rn1der curr01.t ;:oni1>CJ ldW. 'l'h,,rc fore, 
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plaintiff's testimony as to the value of the property for 
sununer home lots, as well as Daadsgaard's testimony as to 
the "hi•-1hest u!id best use" of the property being for 
recreational home sites, is based upon a legal impossi-
bility. Sir.ce the property cannot be so used, and is only 
available for trade ctnd services use, the valuation of the 
property must be adjusted consistent therewith. The work done 
on the land by defendants Carter and Canto clearly improved 
the same for the use for which it was zoned and employed. 
Baadsgaard admitted (Tr., p. 188) that the prop-
erty was zoned for services and trade. He also admitted that 
the use of the property as a trailer park and camping area, 
which is the precise use made by the defendants, would be an 
appropriate and proper use of the property under the present 
circumstances. ('l'r., pp. 188-189, 192-193) 
Second, the court based the award of damages 
upon the value of the property immediately before and 
inunediately after the alleged trespass. In so doing, the 
court failed to take into account the radical improvements 
Whi c;h dcf!'ndctlltS, u,;d their prcclcccssors in interest, had 
lllddc upoll the property prior to the allec3ec.l trespass of 
which the plaintiff complains. Mr. Horlacher testified that, 
when lw purchased the property in 1964, there was a 
"bic1 fir>ld of wild thorn bushes," which he was obliged 
to 'Jl"dde dJ<d clear off the property. ('l'r., p. 217) The 
1 10, ! ll·J,c1 s then, ofter grading the property, proceeded to 
l :it i r: a lrc1iler court and restrooms to acconunodate 
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visi tiug cctmpers d11d deer hu1: Le rs. ('l'r. t PP• 217-218) 
Thus, it is clectr thctt durii;·1 the llorlctchcrs' occupation 
of tne µroperty, its concJi U.oL c1ucl dppe01 d1,cc~ wus sub-
stantictlly improved. ('l'r. t P• nl) If, therefore, there 
was ;,my trespciss ctt ull, which thL" defend<..u.ts do not co1;-
cede, it first occurred when Mr llorL .. cher cJe,ired the thori. 
bushes ar:d improved the property in or about 19 6 4. 
Defer;da11t Ca11to, an edrth mover ctlld land leveler, 
also testified that, i11 his professiondJ opinion, there WJs 
very little diffcrci:cc in thf' coi:dition of the property befon 
and after the grudintJ work which he perfornetl. ('l'r • t P• 277) 
It thPrc'lnrc c1ppcc11s U1"l pl<tiLtiff desires to 
take ,,clvct11ta<Je of tlir• substdLliiJl improvcric1.ts nictcle upo1: 
the property by def c11dct1~ ts cti.d their predecessors in interest, 
in measuring the alleged ddIT.ctqes be fore a11d after the 
supposed trespctss. Un the coi; tJ ary, if dllY dctJnctges ctt ctll 
exist, they should be assessed with respect to the origindl~ 
"trespdss", when th"" \lorlachers first qradPcl «11d removed 
the thon1 patchcs upoll the prop1c1ty. Pl.d.1;tiff should 
not be ctllowed to profit unjustly by the work performed by 
defcl!d,,1.U;' l'n~tlc•~L::;;;oLs u11d1;1 .11. ,,J]e'J'-'cl tr<'SJ>dSS, ,wcl thc 11 
seek redress for allccieclly undoj 1:11 pcirt of the improvements s: 
made by subsequeLl <,Jradi11c;. The bcfore-d1:cl-"fter test, if 
applied at dll, sho11ld n'lctt1' to the crn;dition of the lclf:J 
before .; ll cl d f tr• r ti 1 ,-, i 1 ij_ li ct J "J ] ( ' I c cl tr 1· ci p ,, s ~~ , .i 11 11 11 o t L 0 
sorne other selc,-t,ccJ 'I"' U:. 
Ls dWctrd of 11101:cy dam<1'1'-'" 
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plaintiff, failed to consider the aforementioned factors, 
such award constituted reversible error. In the alternative, 
if any dantaqcs wen• incurred, they should be etssessetl so as 
not to reward plaintiff for the substantial improvements 
performed by defendants upon the land, but rather on the basis 
of the condition of the property in its original state, complete 
with the thorns, as compared to its condition after the 1974 
grading. 
CONCLUSION 
1'he great preponderance of evidence in this case 
clearly demonstrates the occupation, use, and control by 
defendants and their predecessors in interest, and $cquiescence 
therein by plaintiff, of the entire property bordered by the 
natural and man-made boundary lines: e.g., the Dehver and 
Rio Grande Railroad right-of-way on the north, an e)(isting 
fence line adjacent to Tie-Fork Creek on the east, U.S. 
Highway 6 on the south, and the west boundary of a pond on the 
west. 
There is no credible evidence to sustain the finding 
by the trial court of a rectan<Jular parcel bordering on the 
highway. The origi11al deed description itself is erroneous, 
placinq the property so as to embrace a major portion of 
U.S. Ilighwcty 6. There is simply no basis for finding a rec-
L.111quLt1 pdrcel, dcl ju~;tcd northward to corr0ct the faulty 
dc'.'-ic;J j1,tinn, n. ldrqe portion of which then crosses over the 
1
.,j11 n,,d tr<1cks ctnd right-of-way. Such finding, itself 
c:ollcolituting a reformation of the deed, bears no resembiance 
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to the property dctuolly intci;wed to br• conveyed, dEcl sub-
sequer: tly occupied dnd use cl for over twenty ( 2 0) ye ii rs by 
defei:dan ts dnd their µredecessors in interest. 
There is no credible evidence to suµport the 
fir~ding and con•~lusion of tlFo trial court with respect to 
trespass by the defei;dd1~ts or ciEY damage to the plaintiff 
resultin9 therefrom, ci!id the court erred ill its inter-
pretation of the ;,pplicdble rul_es of evideLce. The court 
erred further in its rulin<J or. oclmissibil.ity and in its 
otti tude with respect to the cri ticul testir1ony of the 
ilorlo.chers ctr:J llr. <Jldroyd, rcloti1;9 to re1.iresentations 
mode by the pldi11tift- coJ.ceri:iri•J the ide11t.ificdtion of the 
lond owned, operi.lted, iind controlled by Skyview Enterprises, 
Inc. 
Appell an ts respectfully submit thdt these fir;dings 
by the tridl court constitute clear error, ;,r;d request thdt 
th0 j ud<_Jmen t ctr: cl 0wo.rd of d<tma<JCS to plaintiff be reversed. 
subsequent convey.11,ces in the ch,;in of title be reformcJ to 
titl<::> to the property olon<] the aforeme1;tioned boundary line' 
be quieted iii ctppelL;nt Gerctlcl Carte1· 011 tl-..cc hasis of 
bound<1ry by acquicsc<!1.c1~. 
V. PEkSiilNG NEf,'.~ON 
J\LI)!{ ICll & UEL[ocl;J 
J 3 Ects t 200 1101-th 
Provo, Utoh 84601 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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